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Abstract 
The literature has found that the size of firms matters for innovation and productivity and, 
thus, for economic performance. It is therefore worth explaining why enterprises in Spain are 
small in international terms. Our findings indicate that the quality of the institutional 
environment plays a role. Specifically, this paper analyses the different channels through 
which the efficacy of Spanish courts may affect the size of the companies at the provincial 
level. Regarding the existing literature, this paper is innovative in several important respects. 
First, we disentangle the impact of judicial efficacy on average firm size by differentiating 
between the effect on the growth of incumbent firms (intensive margin) and the effect on entry 
and exit rates (extensive margin), finding clear evidence of the former but not of the latter. We 
do so by using a firm-level database of more than half a million companies and real data (not 
estimates) on judicial efficacy at the local level. Second, this paper is the first to analyse the 
relationship between firm size and the effectiveness of justice after the reform of the civil 
procedures in 2000. Finally, and most significantly, it is the first paper in the literature to 
analyse the specific impact of the various civil procedures, both at the declaratory and the 
executory stage. In general, we find that judicial efficacy has a positive effect on firm size, but 
it critically depends on the type of the procedure, something that the previous literature has 
overlooked. More specifically, judicial efficacy matters at the declaratory stage (e.g. when a 
debt is declared and recognised by a judge), while it does not have a significant impact on 
size at the executory stage. 
 
Keywords: firm size, judicial efficacy. 
JEL Classification: L25, K40, R12. 
 
 
 
 
Resumen 
Diversos estudios han encontrado que el tamaño empresarial está relacionado con 
la innovación, la productividad y, en última instancia, con el rendimiento económico. 
Es por tanto relevante explicar por qué las empresas españolas son pequeñas en 
comparación internacional. Nuestros resultados indican que la calidad de las 
instituciones desempeña un papel relevante. En concreto, el trabajo analiza los 
diferentes canales a través de los cuales la eficacia de los tribunales españoles 
puede afectar al tamaño empresarial medio de las provincias españolas. Esta 
investigación contribuye a la literatura existente en diversos aspectos.  Primero, 
separamos en dos el impacto de la eficacia judicial en el tamaño medio 
empresarial: el impacto en el crecimiento de las empresas ya existentes (margen 
intensivo) y el impacto en la entrada y salida de empresas (margen extensivo), 
encontrando evidencia clara de lo primero pero no de lo segundo.  Para ello usamos 
datos a escala de empresa de más de medio millón de compañías y datos reales 
(no estimaciones) de la eficacia judicial en el ámbito local. Segundo, este 
trabajo/estudio es el primero en analizar la relación entre el tamaño empresarial y la 
eficacia de la justicia tras la reforma de los procedimientos civiles en el año 2000. 
Finalmente, es también el primero que analiza el impacto específico de los diferentes 
procedimientos civiles, tanto en los juicios declarativos como en las ejecuciones. En 
general, encontramos que la eficacia judicial tiene un impacto positivo en el tamaño 
empresarial, pero esto depende claramente del tipo de procedimiento, algo que la 
literatura previa había ignorado.  Concretamente, la eficacia judicial influye en el tamaño 
en el caso de los juicios declarativos (por ejemplo, cuando una deuda es declarada y 
reconocida por un juez), pero no en el caso de las ejecuciones. 
 
 
Palabras clave: tamaño empresarial, eficacia judicial. 
Códigos JEL: L25, K40, R12. 
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1 Introduction 
Spanish firms are small in international terms. Núñez (2004) found that the average size of 
firms in Spain was below that of firms in several other European countries1 or in the US. 
López-García and Sánchez (2010) showed that Spanish companies were on average half as 
large as the companies in other European economies.2
In order to explain the average firm size in any economy, several factors must be 
taken into account. The literature suggests that both income and economic growth in a 
competitive economy have a positive impact on firm size [e.g. Lucas (1978), Tybout (2000), 
Urata and Kawai (2002)]. Access to credit is also a determinant of firm growth (Beck et al. 
2008), as is the amount of available physical and human capital [Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982), 
Kremer (1993), Tybout (2000)]
 Moreover, they observed that the 
weight of the micro-enterprises was larger in all sectors compared to other European 
economies (with the exception of the construction sector). Studying this fact is relevant as 
several studies have shown that there is a positive relationship between firm size and 
innovation or TFP growth. Brandt (2004) suggests that firm size in the manufacturing sector is 
related to increased innovation activity. Pilat (2004) collects various results from the literature 
to conclude that the adoption of advanced technologies, such as ICT, increases with the size 
of firms and plants. The use of new technologies is also related to improvements in the 
productivity of firms. Lopez-Garcia and Montero (2012) found that, in the case of Spanish 
companies (in the manufacturing and services sectors), size has a positive and significant 
impact on the decision to innovate. This does not preclude the opposite also being true (i.e. 
firms that innovate also gain in size). TFP growth is in fact very low in Spain [Mora-Sanguinetti 
and Fuentes (2012)]. 
3
In addition to the above factors, and indeed in relation to them, an ineffective judicial 
system (or, more generally, the quality of the economy’s “enforcement institutions”) may have 
an effect on firms’ size. In this paper we focus on the analysis of the judicial system.  
, the level of specialisation [Becker and Murphy (1992)] and the 
industry in question [Kumar et al. (2001)].  
This choice is warranted by the fact that the Spanish judicial system shows low 
efficiency compared with other countries. First, the “World Business Environment Survey”, 
conducted by the World Bank between 1999 and 2000 and administered to enterprises, 
included some questions to assess the judicial system of the countries and the system’s 
effectiveness in enforcing property rights. Spain obtained worse results than the other 
developed countries with the same level of per capita income and worse than the average for 
the OECD countries in all the questions analysing the functioning of the judiciary. Second, the 
Doing Business Project of the World Bank has published since 2004 a study called "enforcing 
contracts", which includes three indicators of the efficiency of contract enforcement based on 
how a company has to use the judicial system to recover a late payment. Spain ranked 64th 
among 185 countries covered in the reports of 2012 and 2013. Specifically, Spain would be in a 
worse position than other economies with similar levels of development such as the other big 
European economies (with the exception of Italy). These findings are in line with those of the 
                                                                            
1. Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal. 
2. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Finland, France, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal and the UK. 
3. However, the effect of human capital may become insignificant when results are corrected by some other controls, 
such as the defence of (intellectual) property rights or judicial inefficacy [Kumar et al. (2001)].  
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Círculo de Empresarios (2003), which conducted a survey among Spanish companies on the 
situation of Spanish justice. The judicial system obtained a low or medium level of satisfaction, 
reflecting the view that the Spanish courts are too slow and that the predictability of judgments 
is low, thus affecting management decisions. 
All these results point to higher costs for companies when using the judicial system 
and reduced efficiency as a result of longer resolution periods [Djankov et al. (2003)]. They 
also indicate that the Spanish judicial system is more "formal". This means that a company 
needs to undergo a greater number of transactions and to file a greater number of 
documents in order to defend its interests before a court.4
This paper is not the first to explore the relationship between firm size and 
enforcement institutions. To the best of our knowledge, however, few papers have explored 
this issue. Kumar et al. (2001) found that firms in Finland are large despite the country's small 
size because, among other factors, Finland has a very efficient judicial system as compared 
to Spain or Italy. Laeven and Woodruff (2007) and Dougherty (2012) found that firms located 
in Mexican states with weak legal environments are smaller than those located in states with 
better legal environments. Giacomelli and Menon (2012) also found evidence for Italy and 
suggested that the average size of manufacturing firms is lower in municipalities where 
judgments are slower. Fabbri (2010) found that law enforcement in Spain has a significant 
impact on business financing and on firms’ size for her sample of manufacturing companies.  
 
Compared to the existing literature, this paper is innovative in several important 
respects. The first contribution comes from the data used in the analysis. As regards 
measuring firm size, we use firm-level data of more than half a million companies from all the 
relevant sectors of the Spanish economy, whereas previous studies used either aggregate 
data or firm-level data from only the manufacturing sector. As to measuring judicial efficacy5
                                                                            
4. International comparisons of this type must be analysed with caution, as they compare, using relatively simple 
measures, complex legal systems which are essentially different. This is especially the case when comparing legal 
systems based on “Civil Law” (such as Spain, France or the majority of Latin American countries such as Mexico) and 
those based on "Common Law" (essentially the UK) [see, among others, Ménard and Du Marais (2006), Arruñada 
(2007), Mora-Sanguinetti (2010) or Xu (2011)].   
, 
this is the first paper to use real data obtained directly from the courts to calculate our own 
measures of efficacy; the previous literature relied on estimates of the length of the 
procedures, which required assuming a particular probability distribution and did not reflect 
real lengths. The second contribution applies to the Spanish case, since this paper is the first 
to use data reflecting the application of the new civil procedural rules of 2000, which 
completely changed the civil justice system in Spain. We also use data at the provincial level, 
whereas previous studies on Spain used data at the aggregate regional level (comunidades 
autónomas). The third contribution consists of differentiating between the specific impact of 
the various civil procedures available both at the declaratory stage and at the execution stage, 
something previously overlooked and which affects policy recommendations.  Noting the 
differences between declaratory judgments and executions is not only relevant in terms of 
procedures, but also tells us what stage is more important for business decisions: whether 
the time at which a debt is declared and recognised by a judge (declaratory stage), or the 
time at which the judge requires the payment of it (execution stage). Specifically, we find that 
judicial efficacy at the declaratory stage has a positive impact on firm size, while judicial 
efficacy at the execution stage has no impact whatsoever. Thus, the use of “aggregate” 
5.  We prefer to use the concept “efficacy” instead of the concept “efficiency”, which has been used in the previous literature, 
because our study –like previous studies- does not have data on the production function of judicial services and the cost of 
its inputs, so we cannot ascertain whether courts are working on the production possibility frontier or below it.  
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measures of civil efficacy, as was previously the case in the literature, may be misleading. The 
final contribution consists of disentangling the impact of judicial efficacy on average firm size 
by differentiating between the effect on the growth of incumbent firms (intensive margin) and 
the effect on entry and exit rates (extensive margin). Since entering and exiting firms are much 
smaller than incumbent ones in Spain (López-García and Puente, 2007), the positive 
relationship between judicial efficacy and average firm size could be due, for instance, to 
effective courts facilitating exit and hindering entry. Another reason that motivates this analysis 
is the fact that firms’ locations are endogenous and may depend on factors such as judicial 
efficacy. In such a case, if firms prefer regions with more effective Courts and larger firms 
benefit more from them because of their higher demand for judicial services (or have lower 
costs of changing their location), then part of the effect we found could be due to an 
“attraction effect” rather than a “growth-enhancing effect”. However, we find no impact of 
judicial efficacy on entry and exit rates, implying that its impact on average firm size takes 
place through a “growth-enhancing” effect6
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of the 
theoretical channels linking judicial efficacy with firm size. Section 3 proposes the construction of 
various measures of judicial efficacy and size of firms, and discusses the advantages and 
disadvantages of each of the approaches. It also explains how to implement empirically the 
arguments discussed in section 2. Section 4 presents our estimation strategy and discusses the 
empirical results. Finally, section 5 provides some conclusions. The paper is complemented by 
several appendices. Appendix A shows the distribution of judicial efficacy by province and year. 
Appendix B explains the database of enterprises and sample selection criteria. Appendix C 
shows the size distribution of firms in Spain according to our sample. Appendix D provides 
evidence for some other procedures not included in the main sections, and Appendix E shows 
the same empirical analyses with alternative measures of firm size and judicial efficacy.  
. 
 
 
                                                                            
6. In an alternative experiment we have eliminated from our sample the firms that entered or exited the market during the 
period of study (2001-2009) to explicitly rule out a potential “attraction effect”. The results -available upon request- lead 
to similar conclusions.  
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2 Theoretical background: Why the functioning of the judicial system affects 
         firms’ size? 
The literature suggests several theoretical arguments according to which we should observe 
an impact of the judicial system on the size of firms. Depending on one argument or another, 
the sign of the effect could be positive or negative (Giacomelli and Menon, 2012). 
First, following Laeven and Woodruff (2007), who base their arguments on a refinement 
of the model of Lucas (1978), an improvement in the functioning of the judicial system should be 
related to an increase in the size of firms. According to their argument, an improved judicial 
system implies higher production efficiency, which will increase the demand for production 
factors (capital and labor) and will in turn raise wages and rental rates. This will induce low-ability 
entrepreneurs to leave self-employment for wage work, while only the most talented 
entrepreneurs will keep running their own businesses. Therefore, there will be less companies 
and those companies will employ more workers. As a result, average firm size will increase.  
Laeven and Woodruff (2007) also highlight that the impact of the judicial system on 
the size of firms depends on their ownership structure. According to their argument, a 
businessman who invests all his wealth in the ownership of his company is fully exposed to 
the idiosyncratic risks of the firm. Those risks (e.g. expropriation risks) are higher when the 
justice system does not work well, hence deterring investment and firm’s growth. One way to 
mitigate them is through the incorporation of the company, which limits the liability of the 
investor. According to this reasoning, we should observe a greater (positive) effect of an 
improvement in the functioning of the judicial system on firms’ size in the sectors in which 
there is a higher proportion of unincorporated businesses. 
Firm size can also be indirectly influenced by the quality of the judicial system 
through the credit channel. Inefficient systems are associated with worse contract 
enforcement and hence with weaker creditor protection. As a result, weaker investor 
protection would decrease the availability of credit, hampering firm growth. This conjecture is 
corroborated by Jappelli et al. (2005), who find that credit is more widely available in the 
Italian provinces where there is higher judicial efficiency. Fabbri (2010) also finds that the cost 
of financing is higher in the regions where there are longer trials and this could have an effect 
on firms’ size as well. However, greater judicial ineffectiveness, by reducing the access to 
external finance, also reduces the creation of new enterprises, which are usually smaller than 
incumbent firms (Johnson et al, 2002). As a result, the overall impact of reduced funding on 
firm size may be ambiguous when measured empirically (Kumar et al, 2001). 
The effect of an improvement in the functioning of the judicial system would be especially 
pronounced in companies or sectors characterized by a low level of capital intensity (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998a, Kumar et al. 2001). This argument is based on the idea that, at least in developed 
economies such as Spain, the legal system is good enough to protect the physical capital (as its 
measurement is quite straightforward). However, the protection of the intangible assets of the 
company (such as copyrights, patents, etc.) is more difficult. It is therefore possible to find a greater 
variability in the effectiveness of the defense of such capital (depending on the effectiveness of the 
judiciary). However, the empirical evidence is mixed.  Kumar et al (2001) find that more capital 
intensive industries benefit more from good judicial systems, while Dougherty (2012) finds the 
opposite and Laeven and Woodruff (2007) find no significant effect.   
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Finally, an ineffective legal system increases coordination costs among firms and, 
as a consequence, has a negative impact on growth due to lower investment in human 
capital and lower specialization of labor (Becker and Murphy, 1992). Becker and Murphy 
(1992) argue that, in order to take advantage of specialization, it is usual to observe that the 
different companies work together to combine the skills of various specialized workers. In 
order to do so, those enterprises sign contracts and coordinate each other activities. For 
this trade to occur, it is essential that the contract enforcement mechanisms of the 
economy work well (Coase, 1960 and North, 1990). Otherwise, companies could give up 
some of the gains from specialization, so that each company would perform more, less 
specialized tasks. However, they could also integrate vertically to save the costs of 
coordination, thus increasing their size. Hence the overall effect is ambiguous. In fact, 
Laeven and Woodruff (2007) find no significant differences in the impact of justice between 
vertically integrated companies and others that are not. 
In summary, based on the above arguments, it seems appropriate to explore the 
effects of several variables when exploring the relationship between firm size and judicial 
efficacy. First, the incorporation ratio in the province may reduce the negative impact of 
judicial inefficacy on firms’ size. Then, we should control for credit availability as the literature 
observes several ways through which justice affects funding, and for the level of capital 
intensity. We should also control for the extent of vertical integration in the economy and, 
according to Becker and Murphy (1992), for market size, since this would provide a first 
approximation to the potential gains from specialization of companies. Finally, it also seems 
appropriate to control for population density, since it can reduce coordination costs. The 
effects of an inefficient judicial system seem to dominate the effects of other variables such as 
the level of protection of patent rights, tax rates or accounting standards if we follow Kumar et 
al. (2001). In any case, these other factors have little relevance to this study as all 
observations come from a single country (Spain). 
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3 Data 
3.1  Measuring judicial efficacy in Spain 
 
In order to provide a measure of judicial efficacy, the previous literature has used either 
surveys on the quality of the judicial system or estimates of the actual length of the 
procedures. Kumar et al. (2001), Laeven and Woodruff (2007) and Dougherty (2012) use the 
results of surveys administered to the users of the judicial system (the enterprises) or to 
experts (such as litigation attorneys) where they were asked about their opinions on the 
efficiency, quality and integrity of the legal system and the perceived impartiality of judges.  
Giacomelli and Menon (2012) use estimates of the length of civil procedures provided by the 
Ministry of Justice of Italy and the Italian National Institute of Statistics. Their data, however, 
reflect all civil proceedings at a time and they also have to control for the efficiency of tribunals 
courts when resolving criminal cases because those are also solved by the same courts. 
Fabbri (2010) uses a survey by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE) on the length 
of civil proceedings. However, the data are provided in intervals for each duration class (e.g. 
number of cases between 2 and 6 months), so that a uniform distribution within each class 
must be assumed to estimate the average length of trials7
By contrast, this paper constructs a set of efficacy measures using direct information 
provided by the courts, specifically by the Spanish General Council of the Judiciary (Consejo 
General del Poder Judicial, henceforth CGPJ). The CGPJ has published a database reporting 
the number of cases filed, solved and still pending in the Spanish judicial system by region, 
court, year, subject and procedure. This information allows us to differentiate by the specific 
type of civil procedure used at the declaratory stage (ordinary judgment, verbal, monitory and 
exchange) or at the execution stage. The data also provide information on the nature of the 
conflict (civil, penal, administrative or labor) and on the specific court in which the procedure 
takes place. Constructing the indicators from raw data is a complex issue, so the following 
paragraphs attempt to explain how to build these efficacy measures. 
. Moreover, the data used by Fabbri 
(2010) represent judicial performance from the old civil judicial system of Spain (abrogated in 
2000) and do not differentiate among types of procedures. Thus, to the best of our 
knowledge, no previous paper has used actual judicial performance data and distinguished 
among different types of civil procedures.  
As an outline (see Figure 1), first we should identify the jurisdiction that is going to 
deal with the conflicts that we consider the most relevant for the functioning of the company. 
Different types of conflicts are dealt by different jurisdictions inside the judicial system, which 
are served by different groups of judges. Once identified that jurisdiction (orden jurisdiccional), 
we must identify the specific court where a company has to initiate a conflict in order to 
defend its interests and the specific procedure that must be used. 
 
                                                                            
7. It is important to clarify that neither the INE nor the Spanish General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) collect data on 
the length of legal proceedings in the Spanish courts, but estimated lengths by the CGPJ are available. We could have 
used them as in Giacomelli and Menon (2012) or in Fabbri (2010), but those measures are considerably less accurate 
than those used here. Indeed, the CGPJ discourages the use of them as they assume a distribution that does not fit the 
actual data. Moreover, they cannot differentiate among the various procedures available. 
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Figure 1: Outline of the Spanish judicial system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regarding the jurisdiction, Spanish companies may have to deal with very different 
types of conflicts in their daily functioning. A company may have to deal with conflicts with its 
employees (for instance, a fired worker may sue the company). In this case, conflicts are 
regulated by labor legislation and they will be resolved in accordance with it in the social 
courts (juzgados de lo social) inside the social jurisdiction. A company may also have to deal 
with conflicts with the public administrations. For example, the company may be 
discriminated in a public procedure or the administration may not answer properly a request 
from a company. Those conflicts will be subject to administrative Law and solved, first, inside 
the administration through administrative remedies and, afterwards, through appeals to 
administrative courts (juzgados de lo contencioso-administrativo) inside the administrative 
jurisdiction. Finally, conflicts may arise with other private firms or other private parties such as 
suppliers and customers. This is the case when there is a non-payment of a service, when 
there are misunderstandings interpreting the terms of a contract on the sale of goods, 
disagreements on the quality of products or even when defending the intellectual property of 
a work or service. Those conflicts will be dealt by civil courts (juzgados de lo civil) inside the 
civil jurisdiction. We decide to concentrate the analysis in the civil conflicts because we 
consider them the most relevant for the activity of the companies8
Once we have identified the relevant jurisdiction (the civil jurisdiction), we need to find 
the specific courts where the conflict is going to be solved. Those are the first instance courts 
(juzgados de primera instancia) and the first instance and instruction courts (juzgados de 
primera instancia e instrucción), which are entry-level courts. Conflict must enter the judicial 
system through those courts.
. 
9
                                                                            
8. A company may have also violated the public interest and therefore be criminally responsible. However, these cases 
are quite marginal under the Spanish Law. 
  
9. In this study we do not work with the second instance (i.e., appeals against the courts of first instance). The reason is 
that the cases that come to the second instance are only 7.45% of the first (if measured as the number of incoming civil 
and commercial litigious cases in the first and the second instance). In quantitative terms, therefore, it is much more 
important to analyze what happens to the first instance since it affects to a much larger number of companies. This does 
not rule out a possible future extension providing some analysis of the second instance. 
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 Finally, the specific procedure that must be used is determined by the Civil 
Procedural Law10 (CPL), which regulates all civil conflicts in Spain11
From the raw data coming from the CGPJ database we can construct several 
measures of efficacy for each court (or for the provincial aggregate) and for each procedure 
(see Padilla et al. 2007, Mora-Sanguinetti, 2010 and 2012): the congestion rate (see equation 
1 below), the pending cases rate (equation 2) and the resolution rate (equation 3). 
. First, the claimant 
company will have to go through a declaratory judgment in which it will try to demonstrate 
that a debt or other right exists. If that is the case, the judge will declare the obligation of the 
debtor to pay or to compensate the right infringed. There are different types of declaratory 
judgments (see Figure 1).  On one side there are ordinary judgments (juicios ordinarios), which 
will be used if the conflict involves at least 6,000 euros or relies on certain matters (such as 
appeals against decisions of the governing bodies of the company). On the other hand, there 
are verbal judgments (juicios verbales) if the disputed amount is less than 6,000 euros. Finally, 
there are simpler procedures, exchange (juicios cambiarios) and monitory (juicios monitorios) 
that turn into verbal or ordinary if there is opposition of the debtor. Appeals against corporate 
decisions are normally made in Spain through the juicios ordinarios. Thus, we consider them 
to be the most interesting to analyze. However, we have also analyzed the rest of procedures 
and several tables with results are included in the Appendix D. After the declaratory stage an 
execution may have to take place. That stage only takes place when the debtor does not pay 
the debt or fails to comply with the obligations imposed by the judge at the declaratory stage. 
That is, the claimant will ask the judge to (forcedly) “execute” the decision. The judge may, for 
instance, seize the amounts of a debt from the accounts of the debtor. 
ti
titi
ti resolvedCases
casesNewcasesPending
rateCongestion
,
,1,
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+
= −
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ti
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    (3)
 
The congestion rate is defined as the ratio between the sum of pending cases 
(measured at the beginning of the period) plus new cases in a specific year and the cases 
resolved in the same year. A lower congestion rate is related to greater efficiency of the 
judicial system. The pending cases rate is defined as the ratio between pending cases 
(measured at the end of the period) in a specific year and the cases resolved in the same 
period. Higher resolution rate or lower pending cases rate are related to greater efficiency of 
the judicial system. The resolution rate is defined as the ratio between the cases resolved and 
the cases that entered the system in a specific year. An average congestion rate of 2.41 in 
Madrid over the period 2001–2009 indicates that around two and a half cases (summing up 
                                                                            
10. Law 1/2000, of January 7th (Civil Procedural Law). 
11. Two clarifications must be added. First, there are changes in this reasoning if the private subject with which the 
company has a conflict is foreign, but even in this case the CPL may be used (depending on the case). Second, it must 
be noted that some extrajudicial solutions may be found by the parties, as sending the case to arbitration (Ley de 
Arbitraje). However, even in that case only a judge can execute a decision coming from arbitration, using always the CPL 
and the judicial system again. 
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the pending cases and the new cases arriving to the courts of Madrid in a specific year) were 
awaiting resolution while the courts were able to resolve just one.  
Since we have found a very high correlation between the congestion rate (1) the 
pending cases rate (2) and the resolution rate (3)12, using all of them at the same time could 
imply multicollinearity in multivariate regressions. We therefore aggregate them via principal 
component analysis into one variable, named Judicial Inefficacy, for each type of procedure. 
For instance, for ordinary judgments Judicial Inefficacy is a linear combination of the 
congestion rate, the pending cases rate and (the inverse of) the resolution rate13, where the 
weights are the corresponding factor loadings14
ratesolution
ratecasesPendingrateCongestionInefficacyJudicial
Re
1
56.0
59.059.0.
⋅+
+⋅+⋅=
, as shown in (4): 
(4) 
 
However, all the findings of the paper are robust to using alternative measures of 
judicial efficacy that do not rely on principal components analysis, as illustrated in Appendix E.  
The system of procedures explained above was adopted in 2000, replacing the 
previous system (CPL of 1881), and no business conflict has taken the form of 1881 from 1 
January 2001 (Mora-Sanguinetti, 2010). Therefore, although the CGPJ performance data of 
the civil courts are available for the period 1995-2010, we must use only data from 2001 
onwards.  
For the purposes of the analysis herein, we have chosen to aggregate the data at the 
provincial level,15
The CPL establishes the rules of territorial competence, that is, the court that will 
solve the conflict. As a general rule, demands are made on the place of the registered office 
of the defendant.
 although more disaggregated data on the judicial system are available. This 
is due to the lack of more disaggregated data in other important variables such as income per 
capita (e.g. there is no disaggregated data for the GDP of the city of Madrid or the city of 
Getafe, both at the province of Madrid, but we have the GDP for the Madrid province). In 
terms of the analysis this has the drawback of losing the “sub-provincial” action in the 
decision of the agents. That is, enterprise management decisions may be different if it is 
established in a congested zone (city of Madrid) or in a less congested one (surroundings).  
16
                                                                            
12. For instance, for ordinary judgments, the absolute value of their correlation coefficients ranges between 0.81 and 
0.99. 
 However, if the conflict is about the annual accounts of the company, the 
court must be that of the province where the registered office is, and the same rule generally 
applies to bankruptcy proceedings. If the claim has to do with real assets (i.e., buildings), the 
conflict will be resolved at the place where the building is. Moreover, in the case of small firms 
(the vast majority of the Spanish businesses), most of their trade (and negotiations with other 
companies) occurs within one province. All these rules lead us to believe that studying the 
judicial system at a local/provincial (rather than national) level is relevant to the production 
cycle of companies. 
13. We have taken the inverse of the resolution rate because greater inefficacy is indicated by a higher congestion rate 
and a higher pending cases rate, but by a lower resolution rate. 
14. The factor loadings are the correlation coefficients between each variable and the principal component. 
15. Excluding Ceuta and Melilla (no information is available for those provinces). 
16. Articles 50 and 51 of the CPL 
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The competence even at the most micro level (i.e., the allocation of civil affairs 
within the same judicial district) should not be a concern for the analysis. The allocation of 
cases between the courts of first instance of a particular judicial district is made by the 
dean’s office on the basis of predetermined rules, which include, among others, random 
mechanisms (with several corrections). That is, firms cannot choose to litigate before a 
particular judge they may like.  
As previously said, the CPL regulates all civil conflicts in Spain. The CPL establishes 
the formalisms that the parties must observe, the role of the judge, the rules governing 
evidence, the control by superior instances and all related issues.17 Therefore that Law is a 
main determinant of the aggregate efficacy of the judicial system in Spain. However, although 
the CPL is a national-wide Law, the efficacy of courts may differ among Spanish provinces 
due to supply and demand factors. On the supply side, the resources invested in the justice 
Administration differ at least at the regional level18
 
. In the allocation of resources between 
different geographical units, the administration favors the population which needs not reflect 
specifically a particular type of conflict, its relative growth or its complexity (Fabbri et al. 2010, 
Mora-Sanguinetti, 2012). On the demand side, litigation propensity may differ among 
provinces. This geographical variation in efficacy is illustrated in Figure 2a, which shows the 
average of the congestion rate for ordinary judgments (map on top) and executions (map on 
the bottom) at the provincial level for the period 2001-2009. Figure 2b shows the variation in 
time of the congestion (again, for ordinary judgments and for executions) for a group of 
provinces with low congestion (Álava, Guipuzcoa, Navarra and Zaragoza), with high 
congestion (Baleares, Málaga, Almería) and for the case of Madrid. For greater clarity, Table 
A1 (see Appendix A) shows the values of the congestion rate of ordinary judgments for each 
province over the same period. There was, on average, a difference of 1.16 congestion points 
(in ordinary judgments) between the most efficient (Álava) and the least efficient (Alicante) 
province throughout the period. The difference is 3.87 points in the case of executions, 
between Álava (the most efficient on average) and Castellón. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                            
17. The CPL would be supplementary in many cases of labor disputes or against the public administration. 
18. The Spanish regions (Comunidades Autónomas) have some powers related to the administration of justice in Spain. 
Even though the judicial power is not properly transferred to the regions, the management of the means of the judicial 
power is influenced by the policies developed by the regions. For instance, they decide how much money is invested in 
new courts each year in their territories, even though the new courts are integrated in a system that is centrally 
governed. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1303 
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SOURCE: Self elaboration and Consejo General del Poder Judicial (2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a: Judicial Inefficacy: geographical variation.  
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Figure 2b: Judicial Inefficacy: time variation. 
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3.2  Measuring firm size 
 
As for assessing firm size the literature points to different possible measures: value added, 
output or the number of employees (Kumar et al. 2001). Laeven and Woodruff (2007) also 
propose, along with the number of employees, to measure firm size by the capital stock, 
while Giacomelli and Menon (2012) use both employment and turnover.  
Since any proposed measure has its pros and cons, we take an agnostic approach 
and we use the three variables used by the European Commission19
 
 to classify Small and 
Medium Enterprises: total assets, total revenue or turnover and total employment. Those 
variables are obtained using firm-level data from the database SABI for the period 2001-2009.  
The sample has an average of 575,000 firms per year. The geographical variation in firm size, 
according to these three raw measures, is illustrated in Figures 3a, 3b and 3c, which show 
their averages for the period 2001-2009. The temporal variation in firm size is shown in Figure 
4, which displays the national averages for each year. A brief description of SABI and the data 
selection criteria can be found in Appendix B, while Appendix C shows the size distribution of 
firms in Spain by province and by year as the arithmetic averages of employment, revenue 
and total assets, respectively, suggesting that our sample is representative of the population 
of Spanish firms.  
 
Figure 3a: Geographical variation in firm size: number of employees 
>= 15.8511.85 TO 13.859.85 TO 11.850 TO 9.85
2001-2009
13.85 TO 15.85
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration and Consejo General del Poder Judicial (2012). 
 
 
                                                                            
19. European Commission (2003).  
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Figure 3b: Geographical variation in firm size: revenue (thousands of €)  
>= 26802010 TO 26801340 TO 20100 TO 1340
2001-2009
  
SOURCE: Self elaboration and Consejo General del Poder Judicial (2012). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3c: Geographical variation in firm size: total assets (thousands of €) 
>= 28642148 TO 28641432 TO 21480 TO 1432
2001-2009
 
SOURCE: Self elaboration and Consejo General del Poder Judicial (2012). 
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                                       Figure 4: Temporal variation in firm size.  
 
 
In order to aggregate all this information, we construct a size index with employment, 
revenue and total assets, computed as a linear combination of the three variables through 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The moderate correlations among the three variables, 
displayed in Table 1, reveal the shortcomings of the analyses based on only one measure: 
since companies differ in aspects such as their capital-labor ratios, those analyses are 
expected to overestimate the size of some firms and underestimate that of others.  However, 
all the findings of the paper are robust to using alternative measures of firm size that do not 
rely on principal components analysis, as illustrated in Appendix E.  
 
Table 1: correlations among different measures of firm size.  
Total Employment Operating Revenue Total Assets
Total Employment 1.00
Operating Revenue 0.51 1.00
Total Assets 0.39 0.59 1.00  
The PCA yields the size index as a weighted sum of the three original variables, 
where the weights are the corresponding factor loadings20
                                                                                                                   
(5)    
 
, as shown in (5). Then the index is 
rescaled so that its minimum (i.e. the size of the smallest firm) is 0 and its maximum (i.e. the 
size of the largest firm) equals 100. 
                                                                            
20. The factor loadings are the correlation coefficients between each variable and the principal component.  
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Following Davis and Henrekson (1997) and Kumar et al. (2001), for each of the size 
measures we compute two statistics that reflect the average firm size of a province in a 
certain year: an arithmetic average and a size-weighted average. Both indicators have their 
pros and cons, so we use both to check the robustness of our results.  
The arithmetic average may be misleading since it can be brought down by a large 
number of very small firms that account for a very small proportion of the economy of the 
region21
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, and we are ultimately interested in assessing whether judicial inefficacy hinders the 
existence of large firms. By contrast, the size-weighted average puts a greater emphasis on 
the largest firms in each province, since they are the ones that carry out the bulk of the 
economic activity. This statistic is the sum of the size of each firm weighted by the proportion 
of the size of its province it accounts for (e.g. % of employment). Let us define the size-
weighted average (SWA) of the province p in the year t for some measure of size X (e.g. 
number of employees) as: 
 
where i denotes an individual firm and N (p,t) the number of firms in that province 
and year. 
Furthermore, by weighting large firms more heavily we minimize the effects of entry 
and exit because entering and exiting firms are generally much smaller than incumbent ones. 
The drawback of this indicator is that, by putting more weight on larger companies, it may 
also do it on multiplant firms. Since companies with multiple plants located in different 
provinces are likely to use the courts of those provinces, the presence of these companies in 
the data may distort our results. This problem is less important when using the arithmetic 
average, since the majority of Spanish firms are mono-plant22
 
. 
3.3  Measuring firm dynamics 
The average firm size is determined by two factors: the growth rate of incumbent firms and 
the size of entering and exiting firms.  In order to disentangle which factor is driving our main 
results, in a number of experiments we will assess whether judicial efficacy has an effect on 
entry and exit rates. The entry (exit) rate is the number of firms that enter (exit) a market in a 
given year as a percentage of all the active firms in that market at the end of the year (which 
include the new and continuing firms). Due to data constraints, we only have information on 
corporate entries and exits, which we divide by the number of corporations in each province 
and in each year.  
                                                                            
21. Kumar et al. (2001) illustrate this idea with the following example (page 13). “Consider, for instance, automobile 
manufacture in Spain. 78% of the employees in this sector work for 29 firms which, on average, employ 38,302 
employees. There are, however, 1,302 self-employed people, who account for an equal number of firms. Taken together 
with the intermediate categories, the simplest measure [the arithmetic mean] would suggest that the average firm has 
only 570 employees”.  
22. According to the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE), the average number of firms in the period 2001-2009 was 
3,051,634 while the average number of plants in that period was 3,389,330.  
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3.4  Other variables (controls) 
 
With respect to the control variables and following the theoretical arguments discussed in 
section 2, we should include a measure of market size (such as the log of GDP, following 
Kumar et al. 2001, or the log of the population, as in Laeven and Woodruff, 2007). The 
unemployment rate will also capture shifts in aggregate demand as well as income 
distribution. It also seems appropriate to control for population density, since it can reduce 
coordination costs.  
As previously discussed, credit constraints seem to affect firms size (although it 
should be noted that a part of the literature argues that it has to do with the functioning of 
institutions, see Levine, 1998,  La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Therefore, we include a measure 
of banking credit to GDP (Credit/GDP), the ratio of defaulted accounts receivable to GDP 
(Dar/GDP) and the non-performing loans ratio of credit institutions (Npl ratio). Banking credit 
to GDP is a standard measure of the development of the banking sector relative to the size of 
the economy (see Rajan and Zingales, 1995). We expect higher ratios being associated with 
less financial constraints. The ratio of defaulted accounts receivable to GDP is an alternative 
proxy of credit constraints that focuses on trade credit instead of banking credit (Padilla et al. 
2007). A higher ratio means, ceteris paribus, lower incentives of the borrowers to repay –
probably because of poor creditor protection or contract enforcement- which causes more 
credit rationing. The same reasoning applies to the non-performing loans ratio.  
We construct a variable that captures the proportion of limited liability companies in 
each province and year. Laeven and Woodruff (2007) analyze how the impact of judicial 
efficacy on firm size depends on the predominant type of company in each industry. The 
effect of the legal system seems to be larger for those industries in which unincorporated 
firms account for a larger percentage of the total stock of companies.  
Both Johnson et al. (2002) and Laeven and Woodruff (2007) suggest that the effect of 
judicial efficiency on firm size could be more pronounced for nonvertically integrated firms 
because a nonvertically integrated firm relies more on the judicial system to enforce contracts 
with suppliers and customers.  Hence we also construct a measure of vertical integration, which 
is the ratio of value added to sales, where value added (i.e., revenue minus costs of intermediate 
inputs) has been corrected for extraordinary positions.23
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 This ratio is expected to be higher for 
vertically integrated firms because of their lower expenses in outside purchases of intermediate 
inputs. We first compute this ratio at the firm level and then construct aggregate measures of 
this ratio at the province level: the “mean ratio” and the “aggregate ratio”. The “mean ratio” is 
just the arithmetic average of each firm ratio for each province and year. The “aggregate ratio” is 
a ratio of the sum of the value added of each firm to the sum of the sales of each firm. Formally, 
an aggregate ratio (AR) for the variables X and Y of the province p in the year t is:  
 
                                                                            
23. Extraordinary positions are revenues or expenses that do not arise from the regular activities of a firm, such as 
insurance claims. Using accounting identities, it can be shown that value added can be computed as the sum of the 
profit per period, total labor expenses (including both salaries and benefits), taxes, depreciation expenses and interest 
expenses. To correct value added by extraordinary positions we subtract them from the previous sum.  
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where i denotes an individual firm and N (p,t) the number of firms in that province 
and year. 
It can easily be shown that the aggregate ratio equals a weighted sum of the 
individual ratios, with higher weights to larger firms, in analogous fashion to the size-weighted 
average explained above. We use both measures to check the robustness of our results.  
It also seems appropriate to control for industrial composition since, as noted by 
Kumar et al. (2001) judicial inefficiency could affect in a stronger way those industries 
characterized by lower capital intensity and the type of industry is a determinant of firm size 
due to factors such as economies of scale and economies of scope. To capture industrial 
composition we compute the ratio of the gross value added of the main five industries 
(primary sector, energy, manufacturing, construction, services) over the total gross value 
added of each province. We measure capital intensity by the ratio of capital stock (tangible 
fixed assets plus inventories) to the number of employees and we compute both the “mean 
ratio” and the “aggregate ratio”.  
Table 2 contains some descriptive statistics on the variables used in our analyses. 
Table 3 provides a description of those variables. 
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                                        Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Judicial Inefficacy (ordinary) 450 0.04 1.75 -2.02 9.07
Judicial Inefficacy (verbal) 450 -0.08 1.60 -3.29 7.47
Judicial Inefficacy (monitory) 450 0.08 1.69 -2.33 11.37
Judicial Inefficacy (exchange) 450 0.06 1.72 -2.51 14.61
Judicial Inefficacy (executions) 450 -0.18 1.57 -3.11 12.29
Size-weighted average of the size index 450 1.25 2.32 0.03 16.97
Arithmetic average of the size index 450 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07
Entry rate 450 10.28 2.75 4.70 20.83
Exit rate 450 5.73 2.16 1.62 18.96
log(GDP) 450 16.20 0.91 14.19 19.08
log(population) 450 13.27 0.85 11.42 15.66
GDP per capita 450 19.44 4.69 10.64 35.23
Unemployment rate 450 6.51 2.57 2.40 17.70
Demographic density 450 120.24 154.67 8.80 784.82
Credit/GDP 450 0.52 0.22 0.19 1.52
Dar/GDP 450 10.35 6.11 0.66 79.73
Npl ratio 450 1.92 2.14 0.27 16.44
Capital intensity (aggregate ratio) 450 96.76 25.03 39.95 192.18
Capital intensity (mean ratio) 450 161.36 66.33 54.52 560.53
Incorporation rate 450 32.50 5.72 19.36 50.99
Vertical Integration  (aggregate ratio) 450 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.33
Vertical Integration  (mean ratio) 450 0.37 0.02 0.31 0.44
Weight primary 450 6.35 4.55 0.10 22.70
Weight energy 450 3.18 2.84 0.60 18.20
Weight manufacturing 450 14.96 7.40 3.00 38.00
Weight construction 450 11.78 2.43 5.90 20.10
Weight services 450 63.75 7.26 50.30 84.20
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                                                     Table 3: Description of variables 
 
 
Subject Variable in the estimations Sources Period Explanations
Judicial Efficacy Judicial Inefficacy
General Council of the Judiciary 
(CGPJ)
2001-2009
 Linear combination of the congestion rate, the pending 
cases rate and (the inverse of) the resolution rate. 
Firm size Arithmetic average of the size index SABI 2001-2009
Simple average of the size index, a linear combination of 
employment, revenue and total assets
Firm size SWA (Size-weighted average) of the size index SABI 2001-2009
Sum of the size (measured by the size index) of each firm 
weighted by the proportion of the size of its province it 
accounts for
Firm dynamics Entry rate National Statistics Institute (INE) 2001-2009
Number of firms that enter  a market in a given year as a 
percentage of all the active firms in that market at the end 
of the year.
Firms dynamics Exit rate National Statistics Institute (INE) 2001-2009
Number of firms that exit a market in a given year as a 
percentage of all the active firms in that market at the end 
of the year.
Market size log(GDP) National Statistics Institute (INE) 2001-2009 Logarithm of the current GDP per capita of the province 
Market size log(population) National Statistics Institute (INE) 2001-2009 Logarithm of the population of the province
Economic Development GDP per capita National Statistics Institute (INE) 2001-2009 Current GDP per capita of the province 
Economic Development Unemployment rate National Statistics Institute (INE) 2001-2009
Coordination costs Demographic density National Statistics Institute (INE) 2001-2009  Population/surface of the province
Credit constraint Banking credit to GDP (Credit/GDP) Banco de España and INE 2001-2009
Loans to Spanish companies provided by Spanish financial 
institutions, divided by the GDP of the province.
Credit constraint Defaulted accounts receivable to GDP (Dar/GDP) National Statistics Institute (INE) 2001-2009
Trade credit in arrears divided by the GDP of the 
province. 
Credit constraint
Non performing loans ratio of credit institutions (Npl 
ratio)
Banco de España 2001-2009
Ratio of non-performing loans to total banking loans (only 
to Spanish companies by Spanish credit institutions)
Asset protection Capital intensity SABI 2001-2009
Ratio of capital stock (tangible fixed assets plus 
inventories) to the number of employees
Investment risks/idiosincratic risks Incorporation rate INE 2001-2009 Proportion of limited liability companies in the province
Coordination costs/market size Vertical integration SABI 2001-2009
Ratio of value added to sales, where value added (i.e., 
revenue minus costs of intermediate inputs) has been 
corrected for extraordinary positions
Industrial composition
Weight of the 
energy/manufactoring/construction/services
National Statistics Institute (INE) 2001-2009
Ratio of the gross value added of the main five industries 
(primary sector, energy, manufacturing, construction, 
services) over the total gross value added of each 
province
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4 Estimation strategy and results 
4.1  Estimation strategy  
This paper aims to estimate the causal effect of judicial efficacy on firm size. Since both 
variables vary across time and provinces, panel data regression techniques can be used in 
order to exploit both the temporal and the geographical variation of the data. Those 
regressions must be augmented with several other potential determinants of firm size to avoid 
an omitted variable bias.  
Formally the model can be expressed as follows. One option is to fit a model from 
panel data, exploiting the variability in the size of firms and the judicial system in a given 
geographical unit (i) through time (t), as follows: 
it
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where i=1,...,50 provinces, t=2001,...,2009, itSize is either the arithmetic or the size-
weighted average of firm size (in logs), itInefficacyJudicial.  is the measure of judicial 
inefficacy and kitControl is a set of K control variables.  
However, attempting to control for so many factors in samples of moderate size like 
ours often generates multicollinearity problems, leading to large standard errors of the 
coefficients. Table 4, which displays the correlation matrix of the variables, reveals high 
correlations among several ones. Another sign of multicollinearity is the high increase in the 
standard errors when moving from parsimonious to more complex specifications24
Finally, it is worth discussing the possible endogeneity of the variables that capture 
judicial efficacy. Several arguments suggest that judicial services in Spain may be exogenous 
to the average firm size in each province. First, the geographical distribution of the judiciary in 
Spain is based on a very old territorial structure that dates from 1833
. Therefore, 
we decide to control for the factors explained above separately, in several regressions with 
few independent variables, in order to ascertain whether judicial efficacy is a robust 
determinant  of firm size or not.   
25
                                                                            
24. Results available upon request.  
, when provinces were 
established. Such a structure divided the territory into more or less similar regions in terms of 
surface, but not similar in terms of their economic activity or their population. Although the 
number of individual courts in each province has changed over time in response to changing 
populations (which certainly has to do with economic activity), the structure of the judiciary in 
Spain is still inspired by the historical territorial structure. Second, the courts considered in 
this study (“juzgados de primera instancia” and “juzgados de primera instancia e instruccion”) 
are not specialized courts and resolve a wide range of conflicts, many of them totally 
unrelated to corporate decisions (e.g. evictions, inheritance conflicts, etc). Thus the 
distribution of those courts is not necessarily influenced by the distribution of conflicts relevant 
25. Royal Decree of 30 November 1833 on the civil division of Spanish territory in 49 provinces. The basic law governing 
the judiciary in Spain nowadays is from 1985 (Law 6/1985 of 1 July on the Judiciary), which repealed the previous basic 
rules of 1870, 1882 and 1944. The year 1985 could be considered recent in time, but the economic activity of the 
country is radically different today. 
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to firms’ size (for instance, those concentrated in corporate decisions). Judges in Spain are 
also obliged to process and resolve cases in chronological order of entry, and therefore 
cannot give preference to a specific type of conflict. 
Judicial efficacy should enter the model lagged at least one period. This takes into 
account that the decisions of companies (among others, to grow or to invest) need some time 
to be designed and taken after a judgment arrives to the decision bodies of the enterprise (see 
also Fabbri, 2010 and Mora-Sanguinetti, 2012). This fact would also mitigate any problems of 
endogeneity of the judicial variables (without prejudice of the reasoning exposed above). 
Following the reasoning exposed here, it seems appropriate to use a lag higher than one, as the 
general meetings of shareholders, following Spanish Law, take place, by default, annually 
(usually in the first six months of each financial year) (other lags are available upon request). 
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                                            Table 4: Correlation matrix 
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4.2   Results 
 
We have carried out the empirical analysis for each type of procedure (ordinary, verbal, 
monitory, exchange and executions). For brevity of exposition, we shall only display in the 
following sections the results for ordinary judgments and executions, leaving the analysis of 
the verbal ones for Appendix D. The results corresponding to monitory and exchange are 
available upon request.  
We expect the declaratory judgments (ordinary, verbal, monitory and exchange) to 
have a very similar impact on firm size as, under Spanish law, they deal with the same 
subjects, usually just differing in the amount of the conflict. Executions, however, as it was 
explained above, have a different nature and take place later than the declaratory judgments. 
The correlations of our key variable Judicial Inefficacy among those procedures corroborate 
this argument. As we can observe in Table 5, executions are orthogonal to ordinary 
judgments and lowly correlated with the rest of procedures, while all types of declaratory 
judgments are highly correlated among each other, with correlations ranging between 0.7 and 
0.8 in most cases.   
Table 5: Correlations of Judicial Inefficacy among the different procedures.   
 
4.2.1 ORDINARY JUDGMENTS.  
We start the analysis with ordinary judgments because, as previously discussed, they are 
considered the most relevant civil procedures for companies. We run several regressions 
where the dependent variable is the log of the size-weighted mean of firm size. Our key 
regressor is Judicial Inefficacy. We expect it to be negatively correlated with the dependent 
variable, since higher values indicate more inefficacy. Each regression differs in the set of 
controls chosen, in order to account for the different factors that might influence on firms’ size 
and avoid multicollinearity problems. 
 All regressions take into account fixed effects by using the within-group estimator. 
We have tested the convenience of including fixed effects instead of random effects via 
Hausman tests and the significance of the fixed effects via cross-section poolability tests26
In order to control for spatial effects in the size distribution of firms, we use Driscoll 
and Kraay (1998) standard errors, which are robust to cross-section correlation, intra-group 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Substantial cross-section correlation has been found 
. 
We do not include time dummies because they are highly collinear with some of the controls, 
which are very pro-cyclical (credit, GDP, etc). 
                                                                            
26. Results of both tests are available upon request.  
ordinary verbal monitory exchange executions
ordinary 1.0000
verbal 0.8696 1.0000
monitory 0.8282 0.7232 1.0000
exchange 0.7432 0.6340 0.8220 1.0000
executions -0.0014 0.1833 0.1334 0.1154 1.0000
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through the CD test of Pesaran (2004) and the average of the absolute value of the cross-
section correlation coefficients of the regression residuals, which is around 0.5 in all 
specifications. The presence of this type of dependence in the disturbance makes statistical 
inference based on the commonly used clustered standard errors invalid.  
Table 6 displays the first set of regressions where the dependent variable is either the 
log of the size-weighted average of the size index (Panel A) or the log of its arithmetic mean 
(Panel B). Regression (0) is the baseline specification, where the only controls are the fixed 
effects. Regression (1) controls for market size, proxied by the log of population. Market size 
could alternatively be measured as the log of GDP, but its correlation with the log of 
population is 0.95, so that the selection of either proxy does not substantially change our 
results. Regression (2) takes into account economic development by including GDP per 
capita and the unemployment rate. Coordination costs are taken into account in regression 
(3) by including demographic density. Credit constraints are captured in regressions (4a), (4b) 
and (4c) using different proxies: credit to GDP, the non-performance loan (npl) ratio and 
defaulted accounts receivable (dar) to GDP. Differences in sectoral composition across 
provinces and time are explored in regression (5) with the weight of each industry in the total 
economy in terms of value added27
In Panel A we can observe that the variable Judicial Inefficacy has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient which is robust to all specifications. We can evaluate the 
economic significance of the effect by means of a hypothetical simple experiment. Attributing 
to the province with the worst judicial efficacy the best law enforcement in our sample, its 
average firm size would increase between a 5.7 and a 12.1 percent, depending on the 
specification
. Regression (6) includes all controls at the same time.  
28
The results of Panel B are similar to those of Panel A: Judicial Inefficacy has a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient, robust to all specifications. However, the effect 
is smaller: attributing to the province with the worst judicial efficacy the best law enforcement 
in our sample, its average firm size would increase between a 0.8 and a 5.7 percent, 
depending on the specification.  
. Therefore, the impact of judicial efficacy on firm size is also economically 
relevant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                            
27. In order to avoid multicollinearity one of the five weights, the one corresponding to the primary sector, is not 
included. 
28. The province with the best law enforcement (i.e., lowest value of Judicial Inefficacy) is Alava, with an average value of 
Judicial Inefficacy of -1.16 for the period 2001-2009, while the province with the worst law enforcement (i.e. highest 
value of Judicial Inefficacy) is Alicante, with an average value of Judicial Inefficacy of 1.42 for the same period. Therefore, 
the simulated change amounts to -1.16-1.42=-2.58.  
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Table 6: Impact of judicial inefficacy on firm size: ordinary judgments 
Panel A 
  
Panel B  
 
 The dependent variable is the log of the size-weighted average of the size index in Panel A and the log of the arithmetic average 
of the size index in Panel B. All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for defaulted 
accounts receivable. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors  below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from 
the mean-deviated regression. The CD (cross-section dependence) test statistic of Pesaran (2004) follows a standard normal 
distribution under the null of cross-section independence.  The last column reports the average absolute value of the cross-
section correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (5) (6)
Baseline Market Economic Coordination Credit Credit Credit Sectoral All
 size development costs constraints 1 constraints 2 constraints 3 composition
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) -0.044*** -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.037*** -0.026*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.047*** -0.022***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005)
Log (population) 1.358*** 1.570***
(0.362) (0.573)
GDP per capita 0.030*** 0.042***
(0.006) (0.014)
Unemployment rate 0.001 0.037***
(0.004) (0.009)
Demographic density 0.004*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Credit/GDP 0.510*** 0.473***
(0.053) (0.115)
Npl ratio -0.005 -0.035***
(0.004) (0.005)
Dar/GDP 0.001* -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Weight energy -0.030 -0.041*
(0.028) (0.023)
Weight manufacturing -0.030 -0.027
(0.033) (0.035)
Weight construction -0.025*** -0.083***
(0.005) (0.013)
Weight services -0.014 -0.048*
(0.022) (0.026)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared (Within) 4.65 5.94 6.18 5.20 7.00 4.73 4.67 5.15 11.50
CD test 8.01*** 3.71*** 1.99** 5.41*** 2.16** 8.73*** 7.65*** 7.89*** 0.26
Average cross-section 
correlation
0.440.45 0.440.45 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.46
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (5) (6)
Baseline Market Economic Coordination Credit Credit Credit Sectoral All
 size development costs constraints 1 constraints 2 constraints 3 composition
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.011** -0.003***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001)
Log (population) 0.157 0.693**
(0.324) (0.323)
GDP per capita 0.023*** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.006)
Unemployment rate -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.006)
Demographic density 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Credit/GDP 0.164** 0.069
(0.080) (0.051)
Npl ratio -0.013*** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.003)
Dar/GDP -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Weight energy -0.011 0.010*
(0.011) (0.005)
Weight manufacturing 0.006 0.005
(0.005) (0.006)
Weight construction 0.031*** 0.016*
(0.003) (0.009)
Weight services -0.002 0.008***
(0.007) (0.003)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared (Within) 12.65 12.87 29.67 12.67 15.76 20.48 12.91 22.40 38.24
CD test 37.19*** 36.78*** 20.24*** 36.93*** 34.78*** 32.94*** 37.35*** 28.95*** 12.63***
Average cross-section 
correlation
0.420.57 0.490.57 0.58 0.46 0.57 0.59 0.51
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Table 7 shows regressions where another determinant of firm size is controlled for, 
namely Incorporation Rate (proportion of limited liability companies). This variable differs from 
the previous ones in the fact that it may have both a direct and an indirect effect on firm size 
through its interaction with Judicial Inefficacy, as shown in Laeven and Woodruff (2007). Other 
two regressors which could interact with Judicial Inefficacy, Capital Intensity and Vertical 
Integration, are not examined because they are endogenous by construction29
In Panel A we first test whether Incorporation Rate has a direct effect in regression 
(1a), turning out that it has a positive impact on firm size. We then test whether it has an 
indirect effect in regression (1b) by inspecting the significance and sign of its interaction with 
Judicial Inefficacy. The interaction is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the 
negative impact of judicial inefficacy on firm size is higher for incorporated firms, which 
contradicts the finding of Laeven and Woodruff (2007).   
. 
 
In the case of the direct effect of Judicial Inefficacy, the variable keeps having a 
negative and significant impact on average firm size30
Panel B shows analogous regressions to those in Panel A but using the log of the 
arithmetic mean of firm size as the dependent variable. We can again observe that Judicial 
Inefficacy has a negative and significant impact on average firm size. In terms of economic 
significance, attributing to the province with the worst judicial efficacy the best law 
enforcement in our sample, its average firm size would increase between a 4.2 and a 4.9 
percent, depending on the specification. But here there exists an important difference with 
respect to the estimations of Panel A: the interaction term is not significant. Therefore, it 
seems that the effect of incorporation rate on the relationship between judicial efficacy and 
firm size is not robust to the selected measure of the latter. 
. In (1a), since there are no interaction 
terms, one must examine the individual significance of its coefficient. In (1b), where there is an 
interaction term, one must examine the joint significance of its coefficient and the interaction 
via an F-test, as reported in the last row of the panel. In terms of economic significance, 
attributing to the province with the worst judicial efficacy the best law enforcement in our 
sample, its average firm size would increase between a 7.5 and a 10.3 percent, depending on 
the specification. Therefore, the impact of judicial efficacy on firm size is also economically 
relevant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                            
29. Notice that our dependent variable, the size index, is a linear combination of total assets, revenue and employment, 
which are used to construct Capital Intensity and Vertical Integration.  
30. In (1b) the total impact of Judicial Inefficacy on firm size is 0.117-0.005*incorporation rate. Evaluating this function at 
the mean of incorporation rate, 31.42, we obtain a value of -0.04.   
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Table 7: Impact of judicial inefficacy on firm size: ordinary judgments (interactions)  
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
(1a) (1b) 
Incorporation Incorporation
Rate Rate
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) -0.029*** 0.117***
(0.007) (0.022)
Incorporation rate 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.007) (0.007)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Incorporation rate -0.005***
(0.001)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 350 350
Cross sections 50 50
R-squared 5.79 6.82
CD test 2.90*** 2.11**
Average cross-section 
correlation
F-statistic for Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 14.49***
0.43 0.42
(1a) (1b) 
Incorporation Incorporation
Rate Rate
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) -0.019** -0.016
(0.008) (0.010)
Incorporation rate 0.001
(0.010)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Incorporation rate -0.000
(0.000)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 350 350
Cross sections 50 50
R-squared 12.71 12.66
CD test 37.09*** 37.11***
Average cross-section 
correlation
F-statistic for Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 9.19***
0.58 0.57
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The dependent variable is the log of the size-weighted average of the size index in Panel A and log of the arithmetic 
average of the size index in Panel B. All regressions include a constant.  Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors  
below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated regression. The CD (cross-section 
dependence) test statistic of Pesaran (2004) follows a standard normal distribution under the null of cross-section 
independence.  The average cross-section correlation is measured by the average absolute value of the cross-section 
correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. The last column shows the F-test on the joint significance of the 
coefficient on Judicial Inefficacy and its interaction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The main result of the analysis of verbal judgments (displayed in Appendix D) is the 
same as in the case of ordinary: judicial inefficacy has a negative impact on firm size, which is 
robust to all specifications. The analyses of monitorios and cambiarios –available upon 
request- also yield the same conclusion.  
 
4.2.2 EXECUTIONS.  
The methodology for the analysis of executions is identical to that for ordinary judgments. The 
first set of results is displayed in Table 8. In Panel A, where the measure of firm size is the 
size-weighted average, Judicial Inefficacy always has a positive and significant coefficient, at 
variance with the findings of the previous section. By contrast, in Panel B, where the measure 
of firm size is the arithmetic average, that coefficient is not significant in most specifications 
(though positive when significant), indicating that judicial efficacy in executions is not a robust 
determinant of firm size. A possible interpretation of these findings is that firms make their 
business decisions solely based on their expectations about the quality of legal enforcement 
in the first –and usually the only- stage of the process (the declaratory judgement), which 
mainly corresponds to ordinary (or verbal, cambiario, monitorio) judgments. That is, the 
enterprise does not take into account the efficacy in the resolution of executions, because the 
ruling of the judge in that first step is generally sufficient to make the contract parties abide by 
the Law. There may be several explanations for this: late penalties (the company that has lost 
the declaratory judgment may have to compensate for the costs incurred if it does not comply 
with the declaratory judgment upfront), risk aversion (although companies may decide not to 
comply with declarative judgments, we can see that, in most cases, companies immediately 
comply with them, this may be due to an internalization of social values, which does not have 
to be strictly a rational behavior) or even reputation (there is an immediate damage to the 
reputation of the company when it loses a trial, whether or not it decides to comply with the 
obligations imposed by the judge in the judgment). 
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                               Table 8: Impact of judicial inefficacy on firm size: executions  
                Panel A 
  
                  Panel B  
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (5) (6)
Baseline Market Economic Coordination Credit Credit Credit Sectoral All
 size development costs constraints 1 constraints 2 constraints 3 composition
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 0.077*** 0.046*** 0.037** 0.057*** 0.041** 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.068*** 0.028**
(0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.013)
Log (population) 1.763*** 1.718***
(0.467) (0.580)
GDP per capita 0.037*** 0.045***
(0.005) (0.011)
Unemployment rate 0.000 0.038***
(0.005) (0.007)
Demographic density 0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Credit/GDP 0.606*** 0.468***
(0.101) (0.116)
Npl ratio -0.006 -0.037***
(0.005) (0.005)
Dar/GDP 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Weight energy -0.039 -0.043*
(0.026) (0.022)
Weight manufacturing -0.030 -0.025
(0.032) (0.035)
Weight construction 0.002 -0.074***
(0.010) (0.015)
Weight services -0.009 -0.047*
(0.025) (0.026)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared (Within) 2.56 5.08 5.65 3.77 6.33 2.69 2.57 3.36 11.16
CD test 9.03*** 2.76*** 0.36 4.73*** 1.42 9.64*** 8.92*** 6.34*** -0.77
Average cross-section 
correlation
0.410.45 0.440.45 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.45
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (5) (6)
Baseline Market Economic Coordination Credit Credit Credit Sectoral All
 size development costs constraints 1 constraints 2 constraints 3 composition
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 0.020 0.010 0.004 0.014 0.005 0.027** 0.020* 0.008* -0.004
(0.013) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004)
Log (population) 0.552* 0.737**
(0.317) (0.320)
GDP per capita 0.029*** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.006)
Unemployment rate -0.019*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.006)
Demographic density 0.002* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Credit/GDP 0.255*** 0.069
(0.084) (0.051)
Npl ratio -0.013*** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.003)
Dar/GDP -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Weight energy -0.011 0.011**
(0.012) (0.005)
Weight manufacturing 0.005 0.006
(0.005) (0.006)
Weight construction 0.039*** 0.018*
(0.004) (0.009)
Weight services 0.001 0.008***
(0.007) (0.003)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared (Within) 2.20 5.38 26.50 3.65 10.78 9.41 2.42 19.92 38.12
CD test 42.76*** 40.25*** 21.07*** 40.78*** 37.67*** 37.12*** 42.31*** 27.63*** 11.74***
Average cross-section 
correlation
0.420.58 0.480.58 0.59 0.48 0.58 0.60 0.53
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The dependent variable is the log of the size-weighted average of the size index in Panel A and log of the arithmetic average 
of the size index in Panel B. All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for defaulted 
accounts receivable. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors  below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared 
from the mean-deviated regression. The CD (cross-section dependence) test statistic of Pesaran (2004) follows a standard 
normal distribution under the null of cross-section independence.  The last column reports the average absolute value of the 
cross-section correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The analysis of Table 9, which controls for a possible interaction between Judicial 
Inefficacy and Incorporation Rate, shows similar results: the impact of the former is either 
positive or zero. This suggests, again, that judicial efficacy in executions is not a robust 
determinant of firm size. All these results highlight the importance of taking into account the 
type of procedure when studying the link between firm size and judicial efficacy.    
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Table 9: Impact of judicial inefficacy on firm size: executions (interactions) 
Panel A 
 
                                                                Panel B  
 
(1a) (1b) 
Incorporation Incorporation
Rate Rate
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 0.038** -0.016
(0.018) (0.113)
Incorporation rate 0.029*** 0.030***
(0.010) (0.011)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Incorporation rate 0.002
(0.003)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 350 350
Cross sections 50 50
R-squared 4.91 4.95
CD test 1.76* 1.72*
Average cross-section 
correlation
F-statistic for Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 7.63***
0.42 0.42
(1a) (1b) 
Incorporation Incorporation
Rate Rate
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 0.008* 0.075
(0.004) (0.066)
Incorporation rate 0.009
(0.010)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Incorporation rate -0.002
(0.002)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 350 350
Cross sections 50 50
R-squared 5.22 2.78
CD test 41.05*** 41.97***
Average cross-section 
correlation
F-statistic for Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 1.51
0.61 0.58
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The dependent variable is the log of the size-weighted average of the size index in Panel A and log of the arithmetic 
average of the size index in Panel B. All regressions include a constant. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors  below 
coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated regression. The CD (cross-section 
dependence) test statistic of Pesaran (2004) follows a standard normal distribution under the null of cross-section 
independence.  The average cross-section correlation is measured by the average absolute value of the cross-section 
correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. The last column shows the F-test on the joint significance of the 
coefficient on Judicial Inefficacy and its interaction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.2.3 IMPACT ON FIRM DYNAMICS  
The positive impact of judicial efficacy on average firm size, as found in the case of 
declaratory judgments, could take place because of two different channels, which we can call 
the intensive and the extensive margin. In the intensive margin higher judicial efficacy makes 
existing firms grow more, while in the extensive margin it affects firms’ decisions to enter or 
exit a market. Since the average size of the firms that enter and exit the market is much lower 
than the average size of incumbents in Spain (López-García and Puente, 2007), the positive 
relationship between judicial efficacy and average firm size could be due to, for instance, 
more effective courts facilitating exit and hindering entry.  
Another reason that motivates the analysis of firm dynamics is the fact that firms’ 
locations are endogenous and may depend on factors such as judicial efficacy. In such a 
case, if firms prefer regions with more effective Courts and larger firms benefit more from 
them because of their higher demand for judicial services (or have lower costs of changing 
their location), then part of the effect we found could be due to an “attraction effect” rather 
than a “growth-enhancing effect”.  
In order to study the potential impact of judicial efficacy on firm dynamics we regress 
entry and exit rates on Judicial Inefficacy –measured for ordinary judgments- and the previous 
set of controls. Due to data constraints, we only have information on corporate entries and 
exits, which we divide by the number of corporations in each province and in each year. The 
regressions for entry rates are displayed in Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 is analogous to the 
tables in the previous sections. Table 11 shows the results for the variables Capital intensity 
and Vertical Integration measured as aggregate ratios and mean ratios, respectively, while it 
excludes the Incorporation Ratio because it would be an endogenous regressor by 
construction.   
The results indicate that judicial efficacy has no impact on entry rates, so that we can 
rule out any “attraction effect”. In Table 10 Judicial Inefficacy is not significant in six out of the 
nine specifications. In Table 11 it is only statistically different from zero in two cases.  
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Table 10: Impact of judicial inefficacy on entry rates: ordinary judgments 
 
The dependent variable is the corporate entry rate. All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing 
loans and “Dar” for defaulted accounts receivable. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors  below coefficients. The 
“within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated regression. The CD (cross-section dependence) test 
statistic of Pesaran (2004) follows a standard normal distribution under the null of cross-section independence.  The last 
column reports the average absolute value of the cross-section correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (5) (6)
Baseline Market Economic Coordination Credit Credit Credit Sectoral All
 size development costs constraints 1 constraints 2 constraints 3 composition
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 0.171 -0.384*** -0.403*** -0.134 -0.137 0.039 0.142 -0.077 -0.340***
(0.213) (0.138) (0.080) (0.160) (0.133) (0.102) (0.157) (0.095) (0.034)
Log (population) -55.591*** -16.100***
(10.879) (2.997)
GDP per capita -0.380*** -0.287***
(0.138) (0.049)
Unemployment rate -1.064*** -0.594***
(0.063) (0.047)
Demographic density -0.187*** -0.009
(0.039) (0.006)
Credit/GDP -9.190*** 0.788
(2.650) (0.483)
Npl ratio -0.848*** -0.236**
(0.068) (0.106)
Dar/GDP -0.210** -0.076**
(0.081) (0.033)
Weight energy -0.701*** 0.091
(0.152) (0.141)
Weight manufacturing 0.486*** 0.168*
(0.113) (0.096)
Weight construction 0.138 0.221***
(0.095) (0.048)
Weight services -0.719*** 0.096
(0.130) (0.079)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared (Within) 1.51 47.40 69.48 23.92 17.59 57.29 22.19 51.73 78.50
CD test 77.04*** 48.49*** 29.08*** 62.72*** 64.76*** 30.24*** 68.02*** 21.58*** 8.67***
Average cross-section 
correlation
0.370.74 0.440.83 0.56 0.46 0.72 0.70 0.49
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       Table 11: Impact of judicial inefficacy on entry rates: ordinary judgments      
(interactions) 
      Panel A  
 
      Panel B  
 
The dependent variable is the corporate entry rate.  All regressions include a constant. Capital intensity and vertical 
integration are computed as aggregate ratios in Panel A and as mean rations in Panel B.  Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean- deviated regression. The 
CD (cross-section dependence) test statistic of Pesaran (2004) follows a standard normal distribution under the null of 
cross-section independence.  The average cross-section correlation is measured by the average absolute value of the 
cross-section correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. The last column shows the F-test on the joint 
significance of the coefficient on Judicial Inefficacy and its interaction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
(1a) (1b) (3a) (3b) 
Capital Intensity Capital Intensity Vertical Integration Vertical Integration
 (aggregate ratio)  (aggregate ratio)  (aggregate ratio)  (aggregate ratio)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) -0.204 0.033 0.108 -0.245
(0.141) (0.433) (0.158) (0.640)
Capital intensity -0.083*** -0.085***
(0.016) (0.017)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Capital intensity -0.003
(0.005)
Vertical Integration -97.776*** -96.973***
(16.095) (16.646)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Vertical integration 1.445
(2.140)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50
R-squared 19.50 19.63 22.78 22.84
CD test 57.86*** 57.94*** 47.09*** 47.11***
Average cross-section 
correlation
F-statistic for Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 1.61 1.40
0.65 0.65 0.58 0.58
(1a) (1b) (3a) (3b) 
Capital Intensity Capital Intensity Vertical Integration Vertical Integration
 (mean ratio)  (mean ratio)  (mean ratio)  (mean ratio)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) -0.101 -0.035 -0.141*** -0.025
(0.221) (0.406) (0.042) (1.871)
Capital intensity -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.008) (0.008)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Capital intensity -0.000
(0.002)
Vertical Integration -141.758*** -141.965***
(4.883) (7.923)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Vertical integration -0.322
(5.139)
Fixed Effects
Observations 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50
R-squared 11.95 11.98 64.26 64.26
CD test 70.20*** 70.17*** 6.75*** 6.73***
Average cross-section 
correlation
F-statistic for Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 0.29  6.27***
0.43 0.430.76 0.76
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The regressions for exit rates are displayed in Tables 12 and 13, showing that 
Judicial Inefficacy is not a robust determinant of them. In Table 12 it is not significant in five 
out of the nine specifications. In Table 13 it is only statistically different from zero in two of 
them. We can conclude that judicial efficacy has no clear impact on exit rates.  
The results of this section indicate that judicial efficacy has no significant effect in firm 
dynamics –at least, in the case of corporations- which implies that the positive impact on 
average firm size takes place by making existing firms grow more.  
 
Table 12: Impact of judicial inefficacy on exit rates: ordinary judgments 
 
The dependent variable is the corporate exit rate. All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing 
loans and “Dar” for defaulted accounts receivable. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors  below coefficients. The 
“within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean-deviated regression. The CD (cross-section dependence) test 
statistic of Pesaran (2004) follows a standard normal distribution under the null of cross-section independence.  The last 
column reports the average absolute value of the cross-section correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (5) (6)
Baseline Market Economic Coordination Credit Credit Credit Sectoral All
 size development costs constraints 1 constraints 2 constraints 3 composition
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) -0.264* 0.045 0.076 -0.119 -0.066 -0.186*** -0.242** -0.100*** -0.011
(0.134) (0.108) (0.088) (0.114) (0.084) (0.062) (0.094) (0.034) (0.046)
Log (population) 30.946*** 7.423***
(7.102) (2.243)
GDP per capita 0.252 0.099
(0.157) (0.078)
Unemployment rate 0.578*** 0.170***
(0.084) (0.053)
Demographic density 0.089*** -0.012
(0.028) (0.009)
Credit/GDP 5.912*** 0.735
(1.789) (0.628)
Npl ratio 0.500*** 0.178**
(0.045) (0.071)
Dar/GDP 0.160** 0.081
(0.076) (0.052)
Weight energy 0.631*** 0.165
(0.118) (0.102)
Weight manufacturing 0.016 0.124
(0.137) (0.106)
Weight construction 0.061 -0.003
(0.169) (0.164)
Weight services 0.629*** 0.211***
(0.102) (0.064)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared (Within) 5.63 27.89 39.10 13.58 16.05 36.00 24.46 35.91 49.40
CD test 64.98*** 43.14*** 42.88*** 54.20*** 55.92*** 33.68*** 50.62*** 33.02*** 21.37***
Average cross-section 
correlation
0.370.57 0.440.71 0.51 0.50 0.62 0.62 0.48
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Table 13: Impact of judicial inefficacy on exit rates: ordinary judgments (interactions) 
Panel A  
 
Panel B  
 
The dependent variable is the corporate exit rate.  All regressions include a constant. Capital intensity and vertical 
integration are computed as aggregate ratios in Panel A and as mean rations in Panel B.  Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
standard errors below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from the mean- deviated regression. The 
CD (cross-section dependence) test statistic of Pesaran (2004) follows a standard normal distribution under the null of 
cross-section independence.  The average cross-section correlation is measured by the average absolute value of the 
cross-section correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. The last column shows the F-test on the joint 
significance of the coefficient on Judicial Inefficacy and its interaction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1a) (1b) (3a) (3b) 
Capital Intensity Capital Intensity Vertical Integration Vertical Integration
 (aggregate ratio)  (aggregate ratio)  (aggregate ratio)  (aggregate ratio)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) -0.032 -0.323 -0.230** -0.092
(0.079) (0.332) (0.107) (0.435)
Capital intensity 0.051*** 0.054***
(0.012) (0.014)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Capital intensity 0.004
(0.004)
Vertical Integration 51.776*** 51.461***
(7.783) (8.033)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Vertical integration -0.568
(1.408)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50
R-squared 16.33 16.65 14.97 14.99
CD test 55.14*** 55.19*** 54.46*** 54.48***
Average cross-section 
correlation
F-statistic for Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 0.49  8.68***
0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61
(1a) (1b) (3a) (3b) 
Capital Intensity Capital Intensity Vertical IntegrationVertical Integration
 (mean ratio)  (mean ratio)  (mean ratio)  (mean ratio)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) -0.109 -0.281 -0.078 -1.955
(0.104) (0.235) (0.053) (1.362)
Capital intensity 0.013** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.006)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Capital intensity 0.001
(0.001)
Vertical Integration 84.294*** 87.633***
(9.394) (10.485)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Vertical integration 5.187
(3.773)
Fixed Effects
Observations 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50
R-squared 10.94 11.30 40.37 40.96
CD test 60.96*** 61.04*** 25.98*** 25.65***
Average cross-section 
correlation
F-statistic for Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 0.73 2.31
0.41 0.400.66 0.66
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5 Conclusions 
Consistent with the results found by the literature for other economies, this research shows 
that Spanish firms are larger in provinces with more effective courts, i.e. judicial efficacy has a 
positive effect on firms’ size. This is the first time this effect has been confirmed for the case 
of Spain after the new Civil Procedural Law was passed (2000). However, the effect critically 
depends on the type of procedure, an important issue overlooked in the previous literature. 
Specifically, we find that judicial efficacy at the declaratory stage (i.e. when a debt is declared 
and recognised by a judge) has a positive impact on firm size, while judicial efficacy at the 
execution stage (i.e. when the judge requires the payment of it) has no significant impact 
whatsoever. Various reasons may be influencing this fact: penalties for delayed payment, risk 
aversion, internalisation of social values and reputation. We also find no impact of judicial 
efficacy on entry and exit rates, implying that its impact on average firm size takes place 
through a “growth-enhancing” effect rather than through business demography. 
Another contribution of the paper is to use more consistent measures of judicial 
efficacy and firm size than the previous literature on this subject. We construct measures of 
judicial efficacy with real performance data extracted from the courts and not survey data or 
statistical estimations. We gauge firm size by combining several indicators, so that our 
measure is robust to differences in capital-labour ratios and industry idiosyncrasies.  
The results of this study have clear policy implications. Since Spanish firms are small 
in international terms and there is a positive relationship between firm size and TFP growth, 
the results suggest that the role of the judicial system should not be overlooked. Moreover, 
this study identifies the specific procedures and the stages within those procedures with a 
greater impact on enterprise performance in Spain. 
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Appendix A: geographical and time variation of judicial efficacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 MEAN
Alava 2,33 1,58 1,63 1,50 1,70 1,89 1,36 1,36 1,46 1,65
Albacete 3,21 1,72 1,81 1,72 1,66 1,72 1,90 2,49 2,29 2,06
Alicante 4,98 2,42 2,40 2,27 2,23 2,55 2,48 2,81 3,09 2,80
Almeria 3,90 2,13 1,99 2,13 2,05 2,32 2,35 2,70 3,05 2,51
Avila 3,83 1,82 1,71 1,69 1,52 1,65 1,63 2,20 1,67 1,97
Badajoz 2,49 1,68 1,64 1,65 1,69 1,88 1,89 2,20 2,27 1,93
Baleares 4,03 2,27 2,14 2,07 2,31 2,37 2,27 2,99 2,90 2,59
Barcelona 4,20 2,27 2,17 2,06 1,98 2,05 1,93 2,05 2,29 2,33
Burgos 2,97 1,75 1,86 1,76 1,68 1,86 1,74 1,94 1,81 1,93
Caceres 2,60 1,60 1,51 1,53 1,63 1,67 1,60 2,13 2,11 1,82
Cadiz 4,02 2,29 2,06 1,97 1,99 2,08 2,06 2,42 2,61 2,39
Castellon 4,28 2,42 2,18 2,17 2,17 2,28 2,35 2,56 2,87 2,59
Ciudad Real 3,09 2,07 1,99 2,02 2,06 2,02 2,11 2,71 2,44 2,28
Cordoba 3,80 1,84 1,93 1,79 1,73 1,71 1,78 2,02 2,46 2,12
La Coruña 4,24 2,24 2,09 1,90 1,85 2,12 2,11 2,11 2,09 2,30
Cuenca 3,06 1,92 1,77 2,12 1,81 2,14 2,19 2,50 2,49 2,22
Gerona 4,07 2,16 2,16 2,16 2,02 2,01 2,08 2,26 2,35 2,36
Granada 4,71 2,26 2,20 2,04 2,12 2,16 2,21 2,19 2,19 2,45
Guadalaja 3,15 2,01 2,22 2,09 1,87 1,89 2,03 2,05 2,48 2,20
Guipuzcoa 2,71 1,66 1,66 1,51 1,72 1,84 2,10 1,92 2,05 1,91
Huelva 3,73 2,02 1,98 1,94 2,04 2,23 2,38 2,31 2,54 2,35
Huesca 3,32 1,71 1,67 1,69 1,75 1,99 1,90 2,15 2,11 2,03
Jaen 2,94 1,74 1,83 1,83 1,91 2,23 1,87 1,95 2,00 2,03
Leon 2,94 1,76 1,67 1,61 1,68 1,62 1,71 2,08 1,80 1,87
Lerida 2,57 1,73 1,85 1,85 1,84 1,93 1,96 2,09 2,01 1,98
La Rioja 2,70 1,99 1,92 1,98 1,84 1,81 1,65 2,21 1,84 1,99
Lugo 3,08 2,01 1,77 1,64 1,72 1,67 1,68 1,64 1,89 1,90
Madrid 3,76 2,15 2,24 2,15 2,14 2,23 2,11 2,33 2,60 2,41
Malaga 3,88 2,32 2,34 2,15 2,21 2,46 2,46 2,62 2,98 2,60
Murcia 4,70 2,35 2,32 2,08 2,19 2,26 2,08 3,25 3,05 2,70
Navarra 2,86 1,88 1,83 1,84 1,58 1,54 1,48 1,72 1,87 1,84
Orense 3,12 1,99 1,86 1,93 1,84 1,74 1,78 2,10 2,24 2,07
Asturias 3,12 1,75 1,74 1,67 1,69 1,62 1,73 1,99 1,82 1,90
Palencia 2,16 1,67 1,53 1,42 1,50 1,82 1,74 2,01 1,97 1,76
Las Palma 5,02 2,45 2,21 2,21 2,30 2,59 2,73 2,80 2,83 2,79
Pontevedra 4,05 2,36 2,10 1,87 1,94 2,01 1,98 2,31 2,35 2,33
Salamanca 2,46 1,69 1,68 1,56 1,46 1,74 1,72 2,30 2,03 1,85
S.C.Tenerife 4,44 2,20 2,22 2,11 2,19 2,31 2,23 2,65 2,93 2,59
Cantabria 2,93 1,74 1,74 1,83 1,87 1,86 1,88 2,09 2,08 2,00
Segovia 3,14 1,58 1,82 1,74 1,66 1,73 1,90 2,60 2,10 2,03
Sevilla 4,53 2,09 2,10 1,84 1,94 2,09 2,25 2,78 3,07 2,52
Soria 2,86 1,70 1,64 1,56 1,67 1,73 1,46 2,10 1,78 1,83
Tarragona 5,37 2,35 2,24 2,01 1,98 2,11 1,99 2,22 2,32 2,51
Teruel 2,47 1,64 1,67 1,55 1,44 1,97 1,78 1,77 1,74 1,78
Toledo 3,72 2,06 1,88 2,03 2,03 2,17 2,34 3,15 3,14 2,50
Valencia 5,39 2,42 2,35 2,21 2,23 2,39 2,36 2,47 2,69 2,72
Valladolid 2,33 1,67 1,73 1,69 1,61 1,86 1,78 2,13 1,93 1,86
Vizcaya 3,69 1,76 1,84 1,88 1,84 1,93 1,67 1,49 1,69 1,98
Zamora 2,94 1,90 1,60 1,71 1,57 1,75 1,90 2,17 1,82 1,93
Zaragoza 2,99 1,82 1,85 1,82 1,67 1,71 1,66 1,75 2,04 1,92
MEAN 3,50 1,97 1,93 1,87 1,86 1,99 1,97 2,26 2,29 2,18
Table A1: Judicial congestion rate (ordinary procedures)  
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 46 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1303 
        Table A2: Judicial congestion rate (executive procedures)  
 
 
 
 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 MEAN
Alava 1.54 1.84 1.47 2.17 3.74 1.57 2.18 2.87 1.91 2.14
Albacete 3.68 2.83 4.14 2.95 2.96 2.47 3.35 4.39 4.84 3.51
Alicante 3.61 4.27 5.55 4.19 5.13 5.55 4.90 6.26 6.48 5.10
Almeria 3.00 4.00 3.63 3.69 3.24 3.44 3.77 5.00 6.13 3.99
Avila 2.45 1.83 2.74 2.65 3.53 4.95 3.44 4.85 3.40 3.32
Badajoz 2.85 2.96 2.94 2.95 3.43 3.63 4.22 4.53 5.70 3.69
Baleares 3.20 3.19 4.36 5.37 5.70 7.66 8.52 7.50 8.12 5.96
Barcelona 3.83 4.54 4.93 4.59 4.45 4.68 4.65 5.35 5.41 4.72
Burgos 2.41 3.09 2.95 2.74 3.07 2.93 2.81 3.33 3.61 2.99
Caceres 3.48 4.98 3.44 4.14 3.09 3.24 3.97 5.53 5.82 4.19
Cadiz 3.61 3.32 3.32 3.74 3.09 4.46 3.83 4.22 5.56 3.91
Castellon 4.50 5.30 9.49 5.76 5.20 6.32 5.45 5.87 6.25 6.02
Ciudad Real 3.95 5.21 6.92 4.04 4.84 4.54 4.91 6.76 6.42 5.29
Cordoba 2.51 2.80 3.07 4.26 3.45 3.37 2.79 3.04 3.55 3.20
La Coru–a 3.47 3.58 3.12 3.58 3.85 4.17 4.13 4.17 4.53 3.84
Cuenca 3.19 4.88 4.07 3.94 5.13 5.47 4.29 7.12 5.09 4.80
Gerona 2.86 3.90 3.98 4.23 3.96 4.48 4.84 4.86 4.90 4.22
Granada 2.64 3.04 3.45 4.07 3.71 5.39 3.92 3.83 4.44 3.83
Guadalajara 4.89 4.04 4.55 4.57 3.21 3.79 4.73 7.39 5.16 4.70
Guipuzcoa 2.18 1.90 1.74 2.02 2.31 2.62 2.29 2.66 3.04 2.31
Huelva 3.15 3.12 2.88 3.18 3.78 4.68 3.74 5.84 6.68 4.12
Huesca 2.64 3.44 3.61 2.80 2.95 3.03 3.65 4.92 3.66 3.41
Jaen 2.84 2.53 3.31 3.18 3.20 3.22 3.02 3.00 3.36 3.08
Leon 3.46 3.71 4.45 3.14 3.93 3.12 4.97 7.00 3.86 4.18
Lerida 3.96 3.80 4.86 4.01 4.19 4.14 4.65 7.87 8.40 5.10
La Rioja 2.61 2.32 2.77 3.67 3.65 3.27 3.21 3.42 3.15 3.12
Lugo 2.69 2.80 2.53 2.36 2.75 3.43 3.84 3.45 3.34 3.02
Madrid 3.86 4.35 5.03 5.01 4.74 5.26 5.12 5.40 5.51 4.92
Malaga 3.04 3.30 3.30 3.62 3.56 3.79 3.63 4.93 5.99 3.91
Murcia 5.30 4.37 4.04 4.42 5.17 5.24 4.56 5.98 6.74 5.09
Navarra 2.59 4.11 3.44 3.77 4.18 4.76 3.80 4.32 7.44 4.27
Orense 3.62 2.68 3.11 3.35 4.05 4.12 4.17 4.25 6.37 3.97
Asturias 3.87 3.97 4.09 3.69 4.02 3.83 4.11 4.50 4.12 4.02
Palencia 3.05 2.97 2.65 4.17 4.11 3.46 4.23 4.06 6.79 3.94
Las Palmas 3.13 4.26 5.29 4.36 4.66 4.67 4.57 5.01 4.62 4.51
Pontevedra 3.01 3.01 3.06 3.07 3.48 4.68 3.83 5.13 4.46 3.75
Salamanca 2.11 2.81 2.35 2.59 2.30 3.12 2.81 3.97 4.27 2.92
S.C.Tenerife 3.22 3.00 4.18 4.40 5.30 4.78 4.64 6.41 6.20 4.68
Cantabria 2.97 3.03 3.32 3.27 3.81 3.56 3.03 4.57 5.17 3.64
Segovia 2.51 2.77 3.12 3.29 2.62 3.65 3.55 5.42 5.22 3.57
Sevilla 2.75 3.10 3.62 3.44 3.13 4.21 4.80 4.89 4.97 3.88
Soria 3.85 2.61 3.52 2.04 2.44 3.20 2.72 3.18 5.53 3.23
Tarragona 3.96 4.32 4.29 4.25 3.74 4.45 4.54 6.12 6.15 4.65
Teruel 3.49 5.88 5.40 4.88 5.18 5.70 5.22 3.14 5.73 4.96
Toledo 4.47 3.82 4.29 4.55 4.16 4.85 3.58 5.88 6.83 4.71
Valencia 4.94 5.49 6.07 5.09 5.39 6.18 5.53 6.24 7.70 5.85
Valladolid 1.78 3.41 2.04 3.41 3.27 3.54 3.35 8.75 14.26 4.87
Vizcaya 2.05 1.91 2.51 1.99 2.46 2.62 2.21 2.56 3.27 2.40
Zamora 3.60 3.60 3.03 2.83 2.82 3.54 3.58 3.52 4.43 3.44
Zaragoza 2.81 4.29 4.26 3.19 3.67 4.71 5.12 3.11 3.84 3.89
MEAN 3.22 3.53 3.81 3.65 3.80 4.15 4.06 4.93 5.37 4.06
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Appendix B: the SABI database and data selection criteria. 
All the variables related to firm size, as well as those that capture vertical integration and 
capital intensity, are constructed using microdata coming from SABI. SABI is a database that 
contains general information and the annual accounts of over 1.2 million Spanish companies, 
both private and publicly held. The source for these data is generally the office of the Registrar 
of Companies of each country. From this database we can identify the companies located in 
different Spanish provinces in order to obtain a panel with company information by province 
and at different points in time. Specifically, we work with the period 2001-2009. 
Regarding the data selection criteria, we exclude financial companies31 from the 
sample because, as previously discussed, credit constraints may be an important 
determinant of the size of (non-financial) firms. We also remove listed firms because their size 
is not easily compared to those of unlisted firms, since in the case of the former their market 
capitalization value may be much more informative than the book value of their assets. They 
may also be less influenced by local credit conditions because of their capacity to issue large 
amounts of equity and debt in national and international capital markets. State-owned 
companies are also eliminated because in Spain they may resolve their conflicts in different 
courts32 and under different legal procedures than private firms33, and because the factors 
that determine their size may not be market-driven. We exclude foreign companies, as they 
could resolve their conflicts in other legal systems by engaging in “forum shopping”. We also 
eliminate consolidated accounts, i.e., the financial statements that integrate the accounts of 
the parent company and those of its subsidiaries into a single aggregated accounting figure. 
The reason is that several subsidiaries can have different registered offices and in turn use the 
courts of different provinces. Non-profit organizations and membership organizations are also 
excluded. Finally, we also eliminate non-yearly financial accounts -since flow variables such as 
turnover can only be compared for firms with the same time length in their accounts- and 
observations with data inconsistencies34
 
. The final sample has an average of 575,000 firms 
per year for the period 2001-2009.   
Appendix C: size distribution of firms in Spain according to our sample. 
Tables C1, C2 and C3 show the size distribution of firms in Spain by province and by year as 
the arithmetic averages of employment, revenue and total assets, respectively. In terms of the 
three measures we can observe two stylized facts of the Spanish economy:  
(i) Spanish companies are small. The average firm in the sample has less than 13 
employees, its revenue is less than 1.9 million € and its total assets are worth around 2.1 
million €. According to the classification of small and medium-sized enterprises by the 
European Commission (2003), the average firm in the sample would be small, slightly 
larger than a micro-enterprise.  This is consistent with Núñez (2004) and López-García 
and Sánchez (2010), who find that the majority of companies in Spain are either small or 
micro.  
                                                                            
31. By financial firms we mean those companies in the category “J. Financial Intermediation” in the industry classification 
scheme NACE Rev. 1.1. 
32. Administrative courts (tribunales de lo contencioso-administrativo) instead of civil courts.  
33. Specifically, they are often subject to Administrative Law, rather than Civil Law,  
34. For instance, negative values in stock variables or observations that violate basic accounting norms. 
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(ii) The most industrialized provinces have, on average, the largest companies. Madrid, 
the Basque country provinces (Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya), Navarra and Barcelona 
have the highest mean of employment, revenue and total assets.  
 
               Table C1: Firm’s size: arithmetic average of number of employees 
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           Table C2: Firm’s size: arithmetic average of revenue (thousands of €)  
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                Table C3: Firm’s size: arithmetic average of total assets (thousands of €) 
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Appendix D: regression analysis of verbal judgments 
Table D1: Impact of judicial inefficacy on firm size: verbal judgments 
Panel A 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (5) (6)
Baseline Market Economic Coordination Credit Credit Credit Sectoral All
 size development costs constraints 1 constraints 2 constraints 3 composition
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) -0.043*** -0.027*** -0.016*** -0.034*** -0.022*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.015***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
Log (population) 1.715*** 1.764***
(0.367) (0.578)
GDP per capita 0.036*** 0.044***
(0.004) (0.013)
Unemployment rate 0.003 0.039***
(0.005) (0.008)
Demographic density 0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Credit/GDP 0.589*** 0.473***
(0.064) (0.119)
Npl ratio -0.003 -0.036***
(0.005) (0.005)
Dar/GDP 0.001* -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Weight energy -0.036 -0.043*
(0.030) (0.024)
Weight manufacturing -0.029 -0.024
(0.033) (0.035)
Weight construction -0.013** -0.078***
(0.006) (0.014)
Weight services -0.009 -0.048*
(0.023) (0.026)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared (Within) 2.93 5.32 5.46 4.10 6.32 2.96 2.97 3.51 11.11
CD test 9.09*** 3.20*** 0.90 5.36*** 1.92* 9.48*** 8.58*** 7.42*** -0.39
Average cross-section 
correlation
0.410.46 0.450.46 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.46
 
Panel B 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (5) (6)
Baseline Market Economic Coordination Credit Credit Credit Sectoral All
 size development costs constraints 1 constraints 2 constraints 3 composition
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.012** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.013*** -0.005**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
Log (population) 0.311 0.718**
(0.313) (0.311)
GDP per capita 0.024*** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.006)
Unemployment rate -0.019*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.006)
Demographic density 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Credit/GDP 0.182** 0.070
(0.082) (0.051)
Npl ratio -0.012*** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.003)
Dar/GDP -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Weight energy -0.013 0.009*
(0.011) (0.005)
Weight manufacturing 0.006 0.005
(0.005) (0.006)
Weight construction 0.032*** 0.016*
(0.003) (0.009)
Weight services -0.001 0.008***
(0.007) (0.003)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared (Within) 11.69 12.70 28.63 11.99 15.84 18.54 11.86 22.06 38.32
CD test 37.55*** 36.41*** 20.13*** 36.55*** 34.58*** 34.57*** 37.80*** 29.13*** 12.73***
Average cross-section 
correlation
0.420.56 0.490.56 0.57 0.47 0.56 0.59 0.51
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 52 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1303 
The dependent variable is the log of the size-weighted average of the size index in Panel A and log of the arithmetic average 
of the size index in Panel B. All regressions include a constant. “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for defaulted 
accounts receivable. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors  below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared 
from the mean-deviated regression. The CD (cross-section dependence) test statistic of Pesaran (2004) follows a standard 
normal distribution under the null of cross-section independence.  The last column reports the average absolute value of the 
cross-section correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table D2: Impact of judicial inefficacy on firm size: verbal judgments (interactions) 
Panel A  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1a) (1b) 
Incorporation Incorporation
Rate Rate
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) -0.022*** 0.156***
(0.007) (0.023)
Incorporation rate 0.028*** 0.025***
(0.008) (0.007)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Incorporation rate -0.006***
(0.001)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 350 350
Cross sections 50 50
R-squared 5.02 6.26
CD test 2.10** 1.74*
Average cross-section 
correlation
F-statistic for Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 87.28***
0.43 0.43
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Panel B 
 
The dependent variable is the log of the size-weighted average of the size index in Panel A and the log of the arithmetic 
average of the size index in Panel B. All regressions include a constant.  “Npl” stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” 
for defaulted accounts receivable. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors  below coefficients. The “within R-squared” 
is the R-squared from the mean-deviated regression. The CD (cross-section dependence) test statistic of Pesaran (2004) 
follows a standard normal distribution under the null of cross-section independence.  The average cross-section 
correlation is measured by the average absolute value of the cross-section correlation coefficients of the regression 
residuals. The last column shows the F-test on the joint significance of the coefficient on Judicial Inefficacy and its 
interaction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Appendix E: regression analysis of ordinal judgments with alternative measures of 
firm size and judicial inefficacy 
All the findings of the paper are robust to using alternative measures of firm size and judicial 
efficacy that do not rely on principal components analysis. In this Appendix we show the 
results when firm size is measured by number of employees and judicial (in)efficacy by the 
congestion rate.  Table E1 displays the analysis for ordinary judgments and Table E2 does it 
for executions. We observe that the congestion rate has a negative effect on average firm size 
in the case of ordinary judgments, but it has no effect in the case of executions.  
 
 
(2a) (2b) 
Incorporation Incorporation
Rate Rate
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) -0.021** -0.002
(0.009) (0.008)
Incorporation rate 0.003
(0.010)
Judicial Inefficacy (t-2)* Incorporation rate -0.001***
(0.000)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 350 350
Cross sections 50 50
R-squared 12.08 11.92
CD test 37.15*** 37.40***
Average cross-section 
correlation
F-statistic for Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 27.53***
0.58 0.57
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        Table E1: Impact of judicial inefficacy on firm size: ordinary judgments 
       Panel A  
 
     Panel B 
 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (5) (6)
Baseline Market Economic Coordination Credit Credit Credit Sectoral All
 size development costs constraints 1 constraints 2 constraints 3 composition
Congestion rate (t-2) -0.037*** -0.039** -0.053*** -0.025** -0.008 -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.088*** -0.069***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
Log (population) -0.082 0.229
(0.300) (0.490)
GDP per capita -0.008 0.005
(0.005) (0.012)
Unemployment rate -0.003 0.012
(0.005) (0.009)
Demographic density 0.003** -0.006**
(0.001) (0.003)
Credit/GDP 0.301*** 0.623***
(0.081) (0.068)
Npl ratio 0.001 0.005
(0.007) (0.010)
Dar/GDP -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Weight energy 0.028 0.006
(0.020) (0.016)
Weight manufacturing -0.080** -0.077**
(0.037) (0.037)
Weight construction -0.061** -0.087**
(0.026) (0.033)
Weight services -0.062** -0.085**
(0.026) (0.038)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared (Within) 0.32 0.32 0.45 0.51 1.03 0.32 0.33 4.89 7.10
CD test 1.87* 2.06** 3.23*** 0.96 1.23 1.78* 2.10** 1.99** 0.04
Average cross-section 
correlation
0.40 0.41 0.400.40 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Incorporation Incorporation Vertical Vertical
Rate Rate Integration Integration
Congestion rate (t-2) -0.068*** 0.159 -0.041*** 0.091
(0.020) (0.152) (0.014) (0.134)
Incorporation rate -0.016* -0.002
(0.009) (0.017)
Congestion rate (t-2)* Incorporation rate -0.007
(0.004)
Vertical Integration -2.946
(1.870)
Congestion rate (t-2)* Vertical integration -0.528
(0.548)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50
R-squared 0.89 1.13 1.10 0.45
CD test 4.96*** 4.50*** 3.18*** 2.52**
Average cross-section 
correlation
F-statistic for Congestion rate (t-2) 9.40*** 5.75***
0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41
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The dependent variable is the log of the size-weighted average of employment. All regressions include a constant.  “Npl” 
stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for defaulted accounts receivable. Vertical integration is computed as an 
aggregate ratio.  Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors  below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from 
the mean-deviated regression. The CD (cross-section dependence) test statistic of Pesaran (2004) follows a standard normal 
distribution under the null of cross-section independence.  The average cross-section correlation is measured by the average 
absolute value of the cross-section correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. The last column shows the F-test on 
the joint significance of the coefficient on Judicial Inefficacy and its interaction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
             Table E2: Impact of judicial inefficacy on firm size: executions  
                                                            Panel A  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baseline Market Economic Coordination Credit Credit Credit Sectoral All
 size development costs constraints 1 constraints 2 constraints 3 composition
Congestion rate (t-2) 0.023 0.021 0.028 0.011 0.003 0.023 0.024 0.032 0.011
(0.028) (0.035) (0.041) (0.033) (0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.037) (0.039)
Log (population) 0.109 0.438
(0.420) (0.489)
GDP per capita -0.002 0.011
(0.008) (0.009)
Unemployment rate -0.004 0.015**
(0.007) (0.007)
Demographic density 0.003** -0.005*
(0.002) (0.003)
Credit/GDP 0.315** 0.620***
(0.120) (0.067)
Npl ratio 0.000 0.003
(0.006) (0.009)
Dar/GDP -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Weight energy 0.025 0.006
(0.018) (0.018)
Weight manufacturing -0.080** -0.074*
(0.037) (0.038)
Weight construction -0.041 -0.076**
(0.028) (0.033)
Weight services -0.057* -0.085**
(0.029) (0.038)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-squared (Within) 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.41 1.02 0.14 0.15 3.89 6.52
CD test 1.21 1.05 1.72* 0.56 1.08 1.19 1.30 1.00 -0.95
Average cross-section 
correlation
0.40 0.40 0.400.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
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                                                                       Panel B 
 
The dependent variable is the log of the size-weighted average of employment. All regressions include a constant.  “Npl” 
stands for non-performing loans and “Dar” for defaulted accounts receivable. Vertical integration is computed as an 
aggregate ratio.  Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors  below coefficients. The “within R-squared” is the R-squared from 
the mean-deviated regression. The CD (cross-section dependence) test statistic of Pesaran (2004) follows a standard normal 
distribution under the null of cross-section independence.  The average cross-section correlation is measured by the average 
absolute value of the cross-section correlation coefficients of the regression residuals. The last column shows the F-test on 
the joint significance of the coefficient on Judicial Inefficacy and its interaction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
(2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
Incorporation Incorporation Vertical Vertical
Rate Rate Integration Integration
Congestion rate (t-2) 0.039 0.214 0.033 0.333*
(0.043) (0.157) (0.031) (0.196)
Incorporation rate -0.011
(0.012)
Congestion rate (t-2)* Incorporation rate -0.005
(0.003)
Vertical Integration -3.106
(2.153)
Congestion rate (t-2)* Vertical integration -1.186*
(0.666)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 350 350 350 350
Cross sections 50 50 50 50
R-squared 0.44 1.09 0.98 2.39
CD test 2.59*** 3.71*** 2.47** 3.22***
Average cross-section 
correlation
F-statistic for Judicial Inefficacy (t-2) 0.99 2.62*
0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
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